

Can we do without nuclear?
*Mind the economic conditions of
a technological transition*

Jean-Charles Hourcade


DR CNRS, Directeur d'études EHESS




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Lessons from the past, why a technical success

(1-Eimp)/TPES In toe




... leads to so ambiguous economic outcomes




Trade balance vs. energy external bill


France




Germany




Italy




Japan




FRANCE




JAPON



FRANCE




ALLEMAGNE



Between technical and economical success, what parameters?


- A 'electrification nuclear' a lesser import-substitution effect than the « substitution nuclear »
- Exchange rates variations in \$... and other currencies
- Trade balance surplus and the purchasing power of oil and gaz
- Industrial « strategies », including their impact on energy demand
- A « crowding out effect » ???? ... good question but hard to settle

An IAMC exercise: carbon constraints and availability of technological options



A low cost for banning nuclear ... even for a 550 ppm all gases Carbon Concentration Target?

GDP variation from the baseline



Insights for the Future: 'suggestions' from existing world scenarios

- **Can the world « live » without nuclear?**
 - « likely » yes in the absence of carbon constraint
 - « less likely » yes in the presence of carbon constraint
... because the political limits to nuclear have already been internalized in baseline scenarios
- **Will the world « live » without nuclear? This will depend upon decisions in China, India as well as in the US and EU**
- **France, a specific case because nuclear is central in the electrical system**


France without nuclear: Let us pick one plausible but arbitrary baseline ... And the « Taxe Quinet »

- GDP growth rate: ~ from 1,9 % to 1,7 after 2035
- Electricity demand: multiplied by 2 in 2050
- Emissions over 2010 and 2050 (baseline): 12,4 GtCO₂
- Share of the nuclear: between 60% and 70%
- Energy efficiency set of asymptotes
- New and renewable energies: a potential of 30%
- Significant infrastructure investments in transport and buildings
- Implementation of the Quinet's carbon tax


Date	2011	2020	2030	2050
€/tCO ₂	32	56	100	200

- France has a nul external debt and a nul public debt in 2050

GDP variations from the baseline



GDP variations with fine tuned recycling of the carbon tax



Conclusions: a three step debate to be conducted

- **Are carbon – free no nuke options (including energy efficiency) available the transition technically feasible?**
 - Highly controversial but, ultimately
 - A matter of direction of innovation and of pace of deployment

- **Economic lubricants matter**
 - To support the re-direction of microeconomic decisions
 - To minimize the social costs of the transition

- **Societal pre-conditions (not considered in the previous simulations)**
 - The availability of skilled labor: does the education system ‘produces’ enough ingeniers and technicians in the concerned sectors
 - Beyond energy efficiency, the consumption styles



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